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[Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs William Brownfield:] We have a legal problem, so long as they are listed on the foreign terrorist organization list. We are prohibited by law from engaging with the FARC or organizations that are under the FARC's control and/or influence.
What we are trying to do, because the FARC has to a certain extent "captured" the economic development—the alternative development process through several front organizations which have for the first time in the history of Colombia organized the cocaleros—the coca-growers—into organizations as you see in Bolivia to a considerable extent, in Peru to a lesser extent, that then complicates our ability to deal with them.
Tranche one in this four-stage Colombian strategy was the southwest. Down in Tumaco and the province of Nariño. We are unable to support that because the FARC has, in a sense, captured the alternative development part of that. The next step is going to be up in Antioquia. That's further to the north and slightly to the west, but still central Colombia. There, we are trying to work specifically an arrangement whereby the government will work directly with the campesinos themselves, the individual farmers. And we have told the government we will support alternative development. We will provide INCLE funding—generously provided by the United States Congress to the Department of State and INL—and we will support alternative development there.
We will then, ladies and gentlemen, have a test. We'll see how it worked in the southwest, with the FARC largely running the process, how it works up in Antioquia with the FARC out of the process. And then we'll reach some conclusions. What works best?
That is how I want to address your question, and I would hope by the end of this year we will have some quantifiable data that we could offer in terms of which works best.