

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations

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October 6, 2016

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R44647

Summary

Geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with U.S. interests encompassing economic, political, and security concerns. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to advancing democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Current U.S. policy toward the region chiefly seeks to strengthen democratic governance, defend human rights, improve citizen security, enhance social inclusion and economic prosperity, and foster clean energy development and resiliency to climate change. The United States provides foreign assistance to the region to advance these priorities.

Assistance Trends

Since 1946, the United States has provided nearly \$165 billion of assistance to the region in constant 2014 dollars (or more than \$79 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted dollars). Funding levels have fluctuated over time, however, according to regional trends and U.S. policy initiatives. U.S. assistance spiked during the 1960s under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and then declined in the 1970s before spiking again during the Central American conflicts of the 1980s. After another decline during the 1990s, assistance remained on a generally upward trajectory through the first decade of this century. Aid appropriations for the region declined in each of the four fiscal years between FY2011 and FY2014 before increasingly slightly in FY2015 and FY2016.

FY2017 Request

The Administration's FY2017 foreign aid request would provide \$1.7 billion to the region through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Although the overall amount of aid would remain relatively flat compared to FY2016, the allocation of assistance within the region would change in several ways. The request would provide additional development assistance to Central American nations to address the root causes of emigration from the subregion. The request also would increase assistance for Colombia to help end its internal conflict. Conversely, the request would reduce funding for U.S. security initiatives in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

Legislative Developments

On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223) that funds most foreign aid programs and activities at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, until December 9, 2016. The measure also includes \$145.5 million in supplemental FY2016 appropriations for global health assistance to address the Zika virus outbreak. The percentage of those funds that would be allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean remains unclear.

As Congress considers appropriations for the remainder of FY2017, it may draw from the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures that were reported out of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees—S. 3117, reported out on June 29, 2016, and H.R. 5912, reported out on July 15, 2016. Whereas S. 3117 includes 0.09% less funding than the Administration requested for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance globally, H.R. 5912 includes 3.5% more funding than the Administration requested for such programs. The total amount of assistance the measures would provide to Latin America and the Caribbean is unclear because the bills and their accompanying reports (S.Rept. 114-290 and H.Rept. 114-693) do not specify appropriations levels for every country and

program. Nevertheless, congressional priorities appear to differ from Administration priorities in several respects:

- S. 3117 would provide up to \$650.6 million to implement the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is about \$100 million less than requested; H.R. 5912 would provide \$750 million.
- S. 3117 would fully fund the request of \$391.3 million for Colombia, whereas H.R. 5912 would provide at least \$300.1 million for Colombia, with the potential for the total to increase to \$491.2 million.
- S. 3117 would provide no more than \$183.2 million for Haiti, which is \$35 million less than requested. H.R. 5912 does not specify a funding level for Haiti.
- S. 3117 would fully fund the Administration's \$134.7 million request for Mexico, whereas H.R. 5912 would provide an additional \$24 million for security programs in Mexico.

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Introduction

Foreign assistance is one of the tools the United States employs to advance U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. policy goals.¹ Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region (see **Figure 1** for a map of Latin America and the Caribbean). Some countries receive the full range of U.S. assistance as they struggle with political, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in democratic governance and economic and social development; these countries no longer receive traditional U.S. development assistance but continue to receive some support for security challenges, such as combating transnational organized crime. Although U.S. relations with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have become less defined by the provision of assistance as a result of this progress, foreign aid continues to play an important role in advancing U.S. policy in the region.

Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance to the region and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies charged with managing them. Efforts to reduce budget deficits in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and U.S. recession have triggered closer examination of competing budget priorities. Congress has identified foreign assistance as a potential area for spending cuts, placing greater scrutiny on the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. aid programs.

This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It analyzes historical and recent trends in aid to the region, the Obama Administration's FY2017 request for aid administered by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and legislative developments on FY2017 foreign aid appropriations. It also examines policy issues Congress may opt to consider, including the benefits and drawbacks of conditioning aid, the role of the Department of Defense in providing security assistance, and the potential for trilateral cooperation in the region.

Report Notes

To more accurately compare the Administration's FY2017 foreign assistance request to previous years' appropriations, aid figures in this report (except where otherwise indicated) refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State Department or USAID and is requested for individual countries or regional programs. Although this represents the majority of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, several other sources of U.S. aid to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean receive U.S. assistance through State Department- and USAID-managed foreign aid accounts, such as International Disaster Assistance, Migration and Refugee Assistance, and Transition Initiatives. Likewise, some nations receive assistance from U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Inter-American Foundation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral organizations that the United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, provide additional aid to some countries in the region. Because foreign assistance provided through these accounts and agencies is not requested for individual countries and country-level figures are not publicly available until after the fiscal year has passed, these accounts and agencies are excluded from this analysis.

¹ For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R43882, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 114th Congress*, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.

Figure I. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Map resources, edited by CRS.

Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean


The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 1946 and 2014, the United States provided the region with nearly \$165 billion in constant 2014 dollars (or more than \$79 billion in historical, non-inflation-adjusted dollars).² U.S. assistance to the region spiked in the early 1960s following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, an antipoverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the

² These figures include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2014*, at <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports-greenbook.html>. Obligation data for FY2015 and FY2016 are not yet available.

United States provided considerable support to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-1990s following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American conflicts (see **Figure 2**).

U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase once again in the late 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through the past decade. The higher levels of assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive humanitarian and reconstruction aid to several countries in Central America. The establishment of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2004 provided a number of countries in the region with new sources of U.S. assistance.³ More recently, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake.

Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2014
(obligations in billions of constant 2014 U.S. dollars)



Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2014*, at <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports-greenbook.html>.

Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. Obligation data for FY2015 and FY2016 are not yet available.

³ For more information on the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, see CRS In Focus IF10184, *The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): Summary of Recent Developments*, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, and CRS Report RL32427, *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, by Curt Tarnoff.

Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S. assistance through 2010. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive Administrations and Congresses have provided substantial amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Andean neighbors in support of “Plan Colombia”—a Colombian government initiative to combat drug trafficking, end the country’s long-running internal armed conflict, and foster development. Spending received another boost in FY2008 when President George W. Bush joined with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).

After more than a decade of generally increasing aid levels, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to decline in FY2011. This decline was partially the result of reductions in the overall U.S. foreign assistance budget. The Obama Administration and Congress have sought to reduce budget deficits in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis and U.S. recession, and they have identified foreign assistance as a potential area for spending cuts. U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean decreased each year between FY2010 and FY2014. Although aid to the region increased slightly in FY2015 and FY2016, spending caps and across-the-board cuts included in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended, could place downward pressure on the aid budget for the foreseeable future.⁴

The recent decline also reflects changes in the region. As a result of stronger economic growth and the implementation of more effective social policies, the percentage of people living in poverty in Latin America fell from 44% in 2002 to 28% in 2014.⁵ Likewise, electoral democracy has been consolidated in the region; every country except Cuba now has a democratically elected government (although some elections have been controversial).

These changes have allowed the U.S. government to concentrate its resources in fewer countries and sectors. For example, USAID closed its field office in Panama in 2012 following the country’s graduation from foreign assistance, and the agency has largely transitioned out of providing support for family planning and elections administration, as many governments throughout the region have demonstrated their ability to finance and carry out such activities on their own.⁶ Some Latin American nations, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, have begun to provide foreign aid to other countries. Other nations, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have expelled U.S. personnel and refused to allow U.S. programs to continue, leading to the closure of USAID offices and significant reductions in U.S. assistance. As a result of these developments in the region and competing U.S. foreign policy priorities elsewhere in the world, U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean as a proportion of total U.S. foreign assistance dropped from 9% in FY2005 to 6% in FY2015.⁷

⁴ For more information, see CRS Report R42506, *The Budget Control Act of 2011 as Amended: Budgetary Effects*, by Grant A. Driessen and Marc Labonte.

⁵ U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Social Panorama of Latin America, 2015*, March 2016.

⁶ Mark Feierstein, “A New Approach for a Changing Hemisphere,” *USAID Frontlines*, March/April 2012.

⁷ CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson.

FY2017 Foreign Assistance Request for Latin America and the Caribbean⁸

According to the State Department, current “U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere seeks to advance durable institutions and democratic governance, defend human rights, improve citizen security, enhance social inclusion and economic prosperity, secure a clean energy future, and build resiliency to climate change.”⁹ As part of its efforts to achieve those policy goals, the Obama Administration has requested \$1.7 billion in foreign assistance to be provided to Latin America and the Caribbean through the State Department and USAID in FY2017. The request would increase aid to the region by 0.02% compared to the estimated FY2016 level (see **Table 1**). Although the overall amount of aid provided to the region would remain relatively flat, the allocation of assistance within the region would change in several ways.

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Foreign Aid Account: FY2012-FY2017

(appropriations in millions of current U.S. dollars)

Account	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 (estimate)	2017 (request)	% Change 2016-2017
DA	333.8	305.9	214.4	214.1	488.4	412.0	-16%
GHP (USAID)	104.5	78.9	63.1	66.1	67.1	65.5	-2%
GHP (State)	182.2	173.5	157.4	142.5	136.7	145.2	+6%
P.L. 480	38.2	40.5	29.1	21.0	13.0	5.0	-62%
ESF	465.5	447.5	459.3	583.1	419.0	513.4	+23%
INCLE	593.3	550.9	467.1	483.2	524.4	489.0	-7%
NADR	20.5	15.0	14.5	12.6	8.6	25.4	+196%
IMET	14.6	12.9	13.5	13.5	13.0	13.2	+3%
FMF	70.9	59.2	59.3	48.8	69.4	71.3	+1%
Total	1,823.5	1,684.5	1,477.6	1,584.8	1,739.6	1,739.9	+0.02%

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2014-FY2017*, at <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm>; and “FY2016 653(a) Allocations—Final,” provided to CRS in August 2016.

Notes: DA = Development Assistance; GHP = Global Health Programs; P.L. 480 = Food for Peace/Food Aid; ESF = Economic Support Fund; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; and FMF = Foreign Military Financing.

⁸ Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, Fiscal Year 2017*, February 26, 2016, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252734.pdf>.

⁹ Ibid, p. 378.

Foreign Aid Categories and Accounts¹⁰

More than \$627.7 million (36%) of the Administration's FY2017 foreign aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean would go toward development assistance programs (first four lines in **Table 1**). Development assistance seeks to foster sustainable, broad-based economic progress and social stability in developing nations. Such funding is often used for long-term projects in the areas of democracy promotion, economic reform, education, health, and environmental protection. This assistance is provided primarily through the Development Assistance (DA) and Global Health Programs (GHP) foreign aid accounts, which would receive \$412 million and \$210.8 million, respectively, under the Administration's FY2017 request. The Administration also requested \$5 million in development food assistance for the region through the Food for Peace (P.L. 480) account. DA funding would decline by \$76 million in FY2017 compared to the FY2016 estimate while P.L. 480 funding would decline by \$8 million and GHP funding would increase by \$7 million. The large decline in DA is partially attributable to steep cuts to bilateral programs in Brazil and several of USAID's regional programs. It also reflects the Administration's intention to fund with Economic Support Fund (ESF) aid in FY2017 some programs that are currently funded with DA aid.


Another \$513.4 million (30%) of the Administration's FY2017 request for the region would be provided through the ESF account, which has as its primary purpose the promotion of special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs generally aim to promote political and economic stability and are often indistinguishable from programs funded through the regular development assistance accounts. The Administration's FY2017 request for the region includes a \$94.4 million increase in ESF assistance compared to the FY2016 estimate. This increase is partially the result of additional ESF support for Colombia and a few other nations. As noted above, the increase also reflects the Administration's intention to fund with ESF aid in FY2017 some programs that are currently funded with DA aid.

The remaining \$598.8 million (34%) of the Administration's FY2017 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would support security assistance programs (final four lines in **Table 1**). This figure includes \$489 million under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which supports civilian counternarcotics and law-enforcement efforts as well as projects designed to strengthen judicial institutions. It also includes \$25.4 million requested under the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR) account, which funds civilian efforts to counter global threats, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as humanitarian demining programs. Additionally, the Administration has requested \$71.3 million under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account and \$13.2 million under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account to provide equipment and personnel training to Latin American and Caribbean militaries. Total security assistance funding for the region would decline by about \$16.6 million compared to the FY2016 estimate, with decreases in civilian security aid for Mexico, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) partially offset by increased security aid for Colombia.

¹⁰ For more information on the various foreign aid accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report R40213, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, by Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson.

Figure 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Aid Category: FY2011-FY2017

(as a percentage of total U.S. assistance appropriated/requested for the region)



Source: CRS analysis of data from the U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2013-FY2017* at <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm>; and “FY2016 653(a) Allocations—Final,” provided to CRS in August 2016.

Notes: “Military” includes FMF and IMET; “Civilian Security” includes INCLE and NADR; “Political/Strategic” includes ESF; and “Development” includes DA, GHP, and P.L. 480.

Major Country and Regional Programs¹¹

About \$743.6 million (43%) of the Administration’s FY2017 aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean would be allocated to Central America,¹² with the majority of those funds concentrated in the northern triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. U.S. assistance would support continued implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is designed to promote good governance, economic prosperity, and improved security in the region and thereby to address the underlying conditions pushing many unaccompanied children and other migrants and asylum-seekers to leave their homes.

Compared to FY2016 estimates, bilateral aid for El Salvador would increase from \$67.9 million to \$88 million, bilateral aid for Guatemala would increase from \$132.5 million to \$145.1 million, and bilateral aid for Honduras would increase from \$98.3 million to \$105.7 million. Nearly all of

¹¹ For more detailed information on the programs funded by U.S. assistance in each Latin American and Caribbean country, see U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, Fiscal Year 2017*, February 26, 2016, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/252734.pdf>.

¹² This figure includes \$20.9 million in regional health funding provided through the USAID Central America Regional program that the Administration does not consider part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The figure does not include \$28 million in global food security assistance that the Administration did not include in the aid request for Latin America and the Caribbean but does consider part of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The Administration, by excluding the regional health funding and including the global food security funding, arrives at a figure of \$750.6 million for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America in FY2017.

the increased bilateral aid would be provided through the DA account and would support activities designed to strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of municipal and national governments, improve access to quality education and vocational training, increase agricultural production and food security, improve business environments, and strengthen natural resource use and planning.

More than half of the Administration's aid request for Central America would be provided through regional programs. Assistance provided through CARSI, which has been the principal component of U.S. engagement with Central America over the past decade, would decline from an estimated \$348.5 million in FY2016 to \$305.3 million in FY2017. Assistance provided through USAID's Central America Regional program would increase from \$40.4 million to \$53.5 million. The request also includes an additional \$25 million that would be provided through the State Department's Western Hemisphere Regional program in support of the Central America strategy. Although it is unclear how much funding from the regional programs would go to each country, the majority likely would be allocated to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.¹³

Colombia would continue to be the single largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Latin America under the Administration's FY2017 request, with aid rising to \$391.3 million from an estimated \$300.1 million in FY2016. Colombia has received significant amounts of U.S. assistance to support counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000, but funding levels have declined in recent years as the security situation has improved and the Colombian government has taken ownership of programs formerly supported with U.S. assistance. The FY2017 request was intended to strengthen the Colombian government's capacity to end its 52-year conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and implement a sustainable and inclusive peace. It remains to be seen whether a final peace accord will be achieved, however, as Colombian voters narrowly rejected the agreement reached by the Colombian government and the FARC in October 2016.¹⁴

Haiti, which has received high levels of aid for many years as a result of its significant development challenges, once again would be the second-largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the region in FY2017. U.S. assistance increased significantly after Haiti was struck by a massive earthquake in January 2010 but has declined gradually from those elevated levels. The Administration's FY2017 request would provide \$218.1 million to support the Post-Earthquake U.S. Government Strategy for Haiti, which includes four strategic pillars: infrastructure and energy, food and economic security, health and other basic services, and governance and rule of law. This funding level would be a 9% increase compared to the estimated FY2016 level of \$199.4 million.¹⁵

Mexico would be the third-largest aid recipient in the region under the Administration's FY2017 request, although U.S. assistance would continue to decline. Mexico traditionally has not been a major recipient of U.S. assistance due to the country's middle-income status, but it began

¹³ For more information U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS Report R43702, *Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations*, coordinated by Peter J. Meyer, and CRS Report R41731, *Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress*, by Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke.

¹⁴ For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, *Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations*; CRS Insight IN10454, *U.S. Foreign Assistance as Colombia's Peace Talks on Cusp of Completion*; and CRS Insight IN10571, *Prospects in Colombia: Cease-Fire, Peace Accord Vote, and Potential Disrupters*, by June S. Beittel.

¹⁵ For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report R42559, *Haiti Under President Martelly: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns*, by Maureen Taft-Morales, and CRS In Focus IF10440, *Haiti Elections: Hurricane May Force Another Delay*, by Maureen Taft-Morales.

receiving larger amounts of aid through the anticrime and counterdrug program known as the Mérida Initiative in FY2008. The Administration's FY2017 request would provide \$134.7 million for Mexico, a 16% reduction compared to the estimated FY2016 level of \$161.2 million. FY2017 aid would be used to support the Mexican government's efforts to combat transnational crime, reform rule-of-law institutions, protect human rights, strengthen border security, and carry out conservation and clean-energy initiatives.¹⁶

U.S. assistance provided through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) also would decline under the Administration's FY2017 request. CBSI funding supports efforts to increase citizen security and address the root causes of crime and violence in the Caribbean. The FY2017 request would provide \$48.4 million to implement community-based policing programs, support police and justice-sector reforms, provide equipment and training to partner-nation security forces, and offer vocational training and other opportunities to at-risk youth. U.S. assistance provided through the CBSI would decline by about 16% in FY2017 compared to the estimated FY2016 funding level of \$57.7 million.

Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program: FY2012-FY2017

(appropriations in thousands of current U.S. dollars)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 (estimate)	2017 (request)	% Change FY2016- FY2017
Argentina	1,038	765	589	576	550	550	—
Bahamas	190	164	172	200	200	200	—
Belize	687	1,012	1,234	1,058	1,250	1,250	—
Bolivia	28,827	5,171	0	0	0	0	—
Brazil	18,038	15,185	13,858	11,586	12,865	1,165	-91%
Chile	1,155	1,038	1,082	1,032	700	700	—
Colombia	384,288	359,754	330,601	307,776	300,095	391,253	+30%
Costa Rica	1,112	1,624	1,731	1,673	1,825	1,825	—
Cuba	20,000	19,283	20,000	20,000	20,000	15,000	-25%
Dominican Republic	23,129	26,407	23,248	22,350	22,209	22,481	+1%
Ecuador	22,869	18,846	2,000	0	2,000	2,000	—
El Salvador	29,183	27,566	21,631	46,549	67,900	87,982	+30%
Guatemala	84,474	80,779	65,278	113,099	132,515	145,105	+10%
Guyana	10,864	9,150	6,904	4,692	5,658	250	-96%
Haiti	351,829	332,540	300,796	242,922	199,413	218,050	+9%
Honduras	57,040	51,980	41,847	71,191	98,250	105,655	+8%
Jamaica	6,700	7,061	6,670	5,573	5,100	5,600	+10%

¹⁶ For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, *Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Clare Ribando Seelke, and CRS Report R41349, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond*, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 (estimate)	2017 (request)	% Change FY2016- FY2017
Mexico	329,680	265,064	206,768	165,168	161,160	134,664	-16%
Nicaragua	12,301	8,599	8,400	12,054	10,000	14,800	+48%
Panama	3,252	3,449	2,986	4,077	3,350	3,200	-5%
Paraguay	3,773	6,041	7,528	7,980	8,611	6,261	-27%
Peru	79,129	98,634	82,649	84,079	72,700	81,060	+12%
Suriname	239	213	212	199	215	215	—
Trinidad and Tobago	175	167	179	308	325	325	—
Uruguay	539	427	725	550	500	500	—
Venezuela	6,000	5,786	4,298	4,256	6,500	5,500	-15%
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	33,176	32,248	16,734	24,692	27,947	32,874	+18%
USAID Central America Regional	32,089	33,065	33,492	50,762	40,402	53,492	+32%
USAID South America Regional	16,000	13,072	16,500	12,000	12,000	1,741	-86%
USAID Caribbean Development	0	0	0	4,000	4,000	1,160	-71%
USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional	44,900	38,089	29,050	22,500	31,360	23,321	-26%
State Western Hemisphere Regional	220,850	221,291	230,449	341,938	489,991	381,770	-22%
[CARSI]	[135,000]	[145,619]	[161,500]	[270,000]	[348,500]	[305,300]	-12%
[CBSI]	[64,000]	[60,296]	[63,500]	[58,500]	[57,721]	[48,400]	-16%
Total	1,823,526	1,684,470	1,477,611	1,584,840	1,739,591	1,739,949	+0.02%

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2014-FY2017*, at <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm>; and “FY2016 653(a) Allocations—Final,” provided to CRS in August 2016.

Notes: USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross-borders or take place in non-presence countries. The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) are funded through the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.

Inter-American Foundation

In addition to assistance requested through the State Department and USAID, the Administration's FY2017 international affairs budget request includes \$22.2 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF). The IAF is an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (22 U.S.C. § 290f) that promotes and invests in citizen-led grassroots development initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean. The IAF provides grants and other targeted assistance directly to nongovernmental and community-based organizations working to create jobs, increase incomes, encourage civic engagement, advance education and training, conserve natural resources, and improve access to basic services. The IAF is active in 20 countries in the region, including 8 countries in which USAID no longer has a presence. The Administration's FY2017 request for the IAF is about 1% below the estimated FY2016 level of \$22.5 million.¹⁷

Source: Inter-American Foundation, *Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2017*, at <http://www.iaf.gov/home/showdocument?id=581>.

Notes: The IAF receives additional funding through the Social Progress Trust Fund, which is administered by the Inter-American Development Bank and consists of repayments for U.S. government loans to Latin American countries under the Alliance for Progress. The trust fund is diminishing as the loans reach the end of their repayment periods. The IAF will receive \$3.5 million through the trust fund in FY2017, down from \$4.6 million in FY2016 and a historical average of \$8.7 million.

Legislative Developments

On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-223) that funds most foreign aid programs and activities at the FY2016 level, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, until December 9, 2016. The measure also includes \$145.5 million in supplemental FY2016 appropriations for global health assistance to address the Zika virus outbreak. The percentage of those funds that would be allocated to Latin America and the Caribbean remains unclear.¹⁸

As Congress considers appropriations for the remainder of FY2017, it may draw from the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures that were reported out of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees on June 29 and July 15, 2016, respectively. The Senate Appropriations Committee's bill, S. 3117, includes \$32.1 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance globally, which is \$28.9 million (0.09%) below the Administration's request and \$844.5 million (2.6%) below the FY2016-enacted level. The House Appropriations Committee's bill, H.R. 5912, includes \$33.3 billion for bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance globally, which is \$1.1 billion (3.5%) above the Administration's request and \$313.8 million (1%) above the FY2016-enacted level.¹⁹

The total amount of foreign assistance the measures would provide to Latin America and the Caribbean is unclear because the bills and their accompanying reports, S.Rept. 114-290 and H.Rept. 114-693, do not specify appropriations levels for every country and program. Nevertheless, congressional priorities appear to differ from Administration priorities in several respects:

¹⁷ Inter-American Foundation, *Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2017*, at <http://www.iaf.gov/home/showdocument?id=581>.

¹⁸ For more information on the supplemental appropriations to address the Zika outbreak, see CRS Report R44460, *Zika Response Funding: Request and Congressional Action*, by Susan B. Epstein and Sarah A. Lister.

¹⁹ For more information, see CRS Report R44391, *State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2017 Budget and Appropriations*, by Susan B. Epstein and Marian L. Lawson.

- **Central America.** S. 3117 would provide up to \$650.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is about \$100 million less than the Administration's request and the FY2016 estimate. According to S.Rept. 114-290, the measure would provide \$77.7 million for El Salvador (\$10.2 million less than requested), \$134.5 million for Guatemala (\$10.6 million less than requested), and \$103.3 million for Honduras (\$2.4 million less than requested). It also would provide \$260.3 million for CARSI, which is \$45 million less than requested.

H.R. 5912 would provide \$750 million to continue implementation of the Central America strategy. Although the total is equal to the Administration's request, the measure would allocate the funds somewhat differently. According to H.Rept. 114-693, the bill would provide \$77.7 million for El Salvador (\$10.2 million less than requested), \$133 million for Guatemala (\$12.1 million less than requested), and \$102.8 million for Honduras (\$2.9 million less than requested). It also would provide \$393 million for CARSI, which is \$87.7 million above the Administration's request.

- **Colombia.** S. 3117 would fully fund the Administration's request of \$391.3 million for aid to Colombia, which is 30% above the FY2016 estimate. H.R. 5912 would provide at least \$300.1 million for Colombia, which is equal to the FY2016 estimate. An additional \$191.1 million would be available for aid to Colombia if a final peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC is reached and the Secretary of State certifies that supporting implementation of the accord is in the national interest of the United States.
- **Haiti.** S. 3117 would provide no more than \$183.2 million for Haiti, which is \$35 million less than requested and \$16 million less than the FY2016 estimate. H.R. 5912 does not specify a funding level for Haiti.
- **Mexico.** Based on the committee recommendations provided in S.Rept. 114-290, it appears as though S. 3117 would fully fund the Administration's \$134.7 million request for Mexico, which is \$26.5 million less than the FY2016 estimate. According to the committee recommendations in H.Rept. 114-693, H.R. 5912 would provide \$158.7 million for assistance to Mexico, including \$20 million more than requested for INCLE aid and \$4 million more than requested for FMF aid.
- **Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.** According to the committee recommendations in S.Rept. 114-290 and H.Rept. 114-693, both bills would provide more funding than the Administration requested for the CBSI. S. 3117 would provide \$53.6 million, which is \$5.2 million above the request and \$4.1 million below the FY2016 estimate. H.R. 5912 would provide \$57.7 million, which is \$9.3 million above the FY2017 request and roughly equal to the FY2016 estimate.
- **Cuba:** S. 3117 would fully fund the Administration's request of \$15 million to support democracy programs in Cuba, which is \$5 million below the FY2016 estimate. H.R. 5912 would provide \$30 million for such programs, which is double the Administration's request and \$10 million above the FY2016 estimate. H.R. 5912 would stipulate that none of the funds be used for business promotion, economic reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that is "not

democracy-building as expressly authorized in the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.”

- **Venezuela.** According to S.Rept. 114-290, the Senate Appropriations Committee supports the Administration’s request of \$5.5 million in ESF for democracy programs in Venezuela, which is \$1 million less than the FY2016 estimate. The committee expects that the Administration would make additional support available for Venezuela, however, using funding appropriated through the Complex Crises Fund and the Democracy Fund accounts. H.Rept. 114-693 states that H.R. 5912 would provide \$8 million in ESF for democracy programs in Venezuela, which is \$2.5 million above the Administration request and \$1.5 million above the FY2016 estimate.

Policy Considerations

As Congress continues to deliberate on FY2017 appropriations and contemplates other legislative initiatives relating to assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean, it may take a number of issues into consideration. These issues include the benefits and drawbacks of conditioning aid, the role of the Department of Defense in providing security assistance, and the potential for trilateral cooperation in the region.

Aid Conditionality

President Obama’s 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD-6) asserts that long-term sustainable development “depends importantly on the choices of political leaders and the quality of institutions in developing countries. Where leaders govern responsibly, set in place good policies, and make investments conducive to development, sustainable outcomes can be achieved. Where those conditions are absent, it is difficult to engineer sustained progress, no matter how good our intentions or the extent of our engagement.”²⁰ Several studies published over the past decade support PPD-6’s contention that aid recipients’ domestic political institutions play a crucial role in determining the relative effectiveness of foreign aid, although there is less consensus about what types of institutions and policies are necessary.²¹

To ensure that recipient governments are committed to fostering the type of policy environments necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance, Congress often places conditions on aid. For example, both FY2017 foreign aid appropriations bills would require the Administration to withhold assistance for several Latin American and Caribbean nations until these nations take certain actions:

- Section 7045(a)(3) of S. 3117 would require 75% of the funds for the “central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras” to be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that those governments are “taking effective steps” to address 16 concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, increasing government revenues, and investigating and prosecuting security force personnel credibly alleged to have violated human rights. Section 7045(a)(3) of

²⁰ White House, “U.S. Global Development Policy,” Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-6), September 22, 2010.

²¹ Jonathan Glennie and Andy Sumner, *The \$138.5 Billion Question: When Does Foreign Aid Work (and When Doesn't It)?*, Center for Global Development, CGD Policy Paper 049, November 2014, pp. 35-42.

H.R. 5912 would enact similar withholding requirements but would condition 100% of the funds.

- Section 7045(b) of S. 3117 would require 20% of FMF aid for Colombia to be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that various human rights conditions have been met. H.R. 5912 would not condition FMF to Colombia.
- Section 7045(d) of S. 3117 would require all funds for the central government of Haiti to be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that the Haitian government is “taking effective steps” to hold new elections, strengthen the rule of law, improve governance, combat corruption, and increase government revenues. Section 7045(d) of H.R. 5912 would enact similar requirements.
- According to S.Rept. 114-290, S. 3117 would require 25% of FMF aid for Mexico to be withheld until the Secretary of State reports that the Mexican government is investigating and prosecuting human rights violations, enforcing prohibitions against torture, and searching for victims of forced disappearances. H.R. 5912 would not condition FMF to Mexico.

Although these types of restrictions can provide leverage to executive branch officials who are pushing recipient governments to enact difficult policy changes, some U.S. officials maintain that aid restrictions sometimes hinder officials’ ability to advance U.S. policy objectives. For example, although Central American migration to the United States increased substantially over the course of FY2016, much of the funding for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is designed to address the underlying conditions pushing Central Americans to leave their homes, was not available for obligation until the fiscal year was almost over. Some U.S. defense officials also have asserted that recipient nations frustrated by conditions on U.S. security assistance could seek assistance elsewhere and the United States could be displaced as the region’s partner of choice by countries that place no emphasis on human rights or good governance.²²

There is considerable debate internationally about whether conditionality changes aid recipient behavior or makes aid more effective. Although numerous studies have examined the impact of conditionality, they have found mixed results. In many cases, conditions have proven ineffective because international donors, including the United States, have been unwilling to enforce strict compliance in recipient countries where other strategic interests are at play. In other cases, recipient countries have been willing to forgo conditioned aid due to their lack of dependence on assistance or their ability to receive non-conditioned aid from other donors.²³

Department of Defense Role in Security Assistance

Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title 22 of the *U.S. Code* (Foreign Relations) and appropriated funding for these programs through State Department accounts in annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations legislation. Since the 1980s, however, Congress has provided numerous security assistance authorities to the Department of Defense (DOD) under Title 10 of the *U.S. Code* (Armed Services) and the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and has

²² U.S. Southern Command, *Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States Southern Command, Before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee*, March 12, 2015.

²³ Andrew Mold, *Policy Ownership and Aid Conditionality in the Light of the Financial Crisis: A Critical Review*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Centre Studies, 2009, p. 78; Melissa G. Dalton, *Smart Conditions: A Strategic Framework for Leveraging Security Assistance*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 2016, p.5.

appropriated funding for the new activities (referred to as “security cooperation” by DOD) through annual DOD appropriations.²⁴ As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean nations receive training, equipment, and other support from DOD in addition to the assistance provided through the traditional U.S. foreign aid budget examined in this report.

The vast majority of DOD security cooperation activities in the region are conducted under DOD’s counternarcotics authorities.²⁵ In FY2016, DOD provided an estimated \$195.4 million in counternarcotics support to at least 14 Latin American and Caribbean nations. This figure includes \$64.2 million for Mexico, \$57.6 million for Colombia, and a combined \$35.5 million for the northern triangle of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).²⁶

DOD also has carried out a growing number of joint training programs, exercises, and other military-to-military exchanges in the region, which benefit partner countries but often have the primary purpose of training U.S. forces. The number of U.S. Special Operations Forces training missions conducted under the Joint Combined Exchange Training Program,²⁷ for example, reportedly tripled between 2007 and 2014, from 12 missions involving 560 foreign personnel to 36 missions involving 2,300 foreign personnel.²⁸

Congress has increased DOD authorities and resources to conduct security cooperation activities partly because of DOD’s unique capabilities and partly because of the perception that the traditional security assistance programs overseen by the State Department lack the flexibility to respond to evolving security threats. The expansion of DOD authorities and resources may have had some unforeseen consequences, however, potentially hindering Congress’s ability to formulate and exercise effective oversight of U.S. foreign assistance policy in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Whereas the State Department provides overviews of its planned assistance programs in the annual congressional budget justification for foreign operations, which is available online, reports concerning DOD security cooperation activities often are not available to the public and are not always provided to the congressional committees charged with authorizing and appropriating traditional foreign assistance. This lack of information may hinder congressional efforts to establish budget priorities and shape the relative balance of U.S. assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean. For example, security aid accounted for 35% of the assistance Congress appropriated for the region through the traditional foreign aid budget in FY2016. Once DOD

²⁴ For more information, see CRS Report R44444, *Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense*, by Nina M. Serafino.

²⁵ Under §1004 of the NDAA of 1991 (P.L. 101-510), as amended, DOD is authorized to support foreign counterdrug efforts through training, transportation, reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, and infrastructure construction. Under §1033 of the NDAA of 1998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended, DOD is authorized to provide certain countries with various types of nonlethal equipment to be used for counterdrug activities. Under §1021 of the NDAA of 2005 (P.L. 108-375), as amended, DOD is authorized to use counternarcotics funds in Colombia for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorism. For more information, see CRS Report RL34543, *International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses*, by Liana W. Rosen.

²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, “Counternarcotics (CN) Support to Foreign Countries by COCOM and Country,” provided to CRS in 2016.

²⁷ 10 U.S.C. §2011 authorizes the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command or any other unified or specified command to pay the expenses of special operations forces training, or training with, security forces of a friendly foreign country; the expenses of deploying special operations forces for that training; and incremental expenses incurred by a friendly developing country as a direct result of that training. The statute specifies that the primary purpose of such activities is to train U.S. Special Operations Forces.

²⁸ Sarah Kinoshian and Adam Isacson, “U.S. Special Operations in Latin America: Parallel Diplomacy?,” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), August 30, 2016.

counternarcotics support is included, security aid climbs to 42% of the total, potentially placing more emphasis on U.S. military support to the region than Members of Congress charged with overseeing the foreign assistance budget had intended.

The growth of DOD security cooperation programs also may weaken Congress's ability to incentivize policy changes in recipient nations. DOD security cooperation programs abide by a number of restrictions, including the "Leahy laws," which require foreign security forces to be vetted and prohibit funding for any unit if there is credible evidence the unit has committed "a gross violation of human rights."²⁹ However, none of the conditions on aid to Latin American and Caribbean nations enacted through annual foreign aid appropriations bills, such as those discussed previously (see "Aid Conditionality"), apply to DOD security cooperation programs. This may allow DOD to continue supporting counternarcotics activities or other critical security interests in the region, but it also may weaken recipient nations' incentives to comply with legislative conditions. In FY2016, for example, Congress required the State Department to withhold 19% of the FMF appropriated for Colombia (\$5.1 million) until the Secretary of State could certify that the Colombian government was addressing certain human rights concerns. During the same fiscal year, DOD counternarcotics aid for Colombia, which was not subject to those conditions, totaled more than 11 times the withheld amount.

The FY2017 NDAA could have several implications for the future of DOD security assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean and for congressional oversight of those programs. The House-passed version of the NDAA (H.R. 4909) would extend several DOD counternarcotics authorities, require DOD to report annually on its security cooperation programs, and require an independent assessment of those programs. The Senate-passed version of the NDAA (S. 2943) would require DOD to submit annual budget requests for all security cooperation programs and activities, including, to the maximum extent practicable, specific amounts by country or region. It also would require assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of DOD security cooperation programs and activities. Additionally, the measure would expand DOD's authorities to train and equip foreign security forces and consolidate a number of funding streams for such programs into a single Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund (SCEF).³⁰ Because funding for DOD counternarcotics assistance programs, currently appropriated through a dedicated central transfer account, would be moved to the SCEF, some U.S. defense officials are concerned that funds formerly dedicated to counternarcotics programs in Latin America and the Caribbean could be allocated to security efforts elsewhere in the world. Both versions of the NDAA would require DOD to report on its security cooperation programs to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in addition to the congressional defense committees.

Trilateral Cooperation

As noted previously, many Latin American and Caribbean countries have made considerable strides in consolidating democratic governance and fostering economic and social development over the past two decades. This progress has led to the closure of USAID field offices and considerable reductions in aid. As U.S. relations with these countries have become less defined by the provision of assistance, policymakers have begun to contemplate how the U.S. government

²⁹ For more information on these human rights vetting requirements, see CRS Report R43361, *"Leahy Law" Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview*, coordinated by Nina M. Serafino.

³⁰ For more information, see CRS Insight IN10538, *Security Cooperation and the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)*, by Liana W. Rosen et al.

might remain engaged with its historic aid partners to advance U.S. policy objectives in the region.

As some nations in the hemisphere have transitioned from aid recipients to emerging aid donors, the U.S. government has partnered with them through so-called “trilateral cooperation” initiatives to jointly plan and fund assistance programs elsewhere in the region. Brazil, for example, received significant U.S. assistance to modernize its agricultural sector in the 1960s and 1970s before becoming the world’s third-largest agricultural producer. Brazilian institutions are now sharing their expertise with other countries, collaborating with USAID to improve agricultural productivity and food security in countries such as Haiti, Honduras, and Mozambique.³¹ Similarly, the U.S. government has invested heavily in training and equipping Colombian security forces over the past 15 years. Those same security forces have now trained more than 7,500 military and police in Central America and the Dominican Republic under the U.S.-Colombia Security Cooperation Action Plan.³² The United States also has partnered with Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay to support development and security efforts throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

In recent years—although not in the FY2017 foreign aid budget justification—the Obama Administration has requested funding to strengthen ties with emerging donors and implement trilateral cooperation programs in the region. In FY2016, for example, the Administration requested funding for renewable energy projects in Honduras that would be jointly implemented by Brazil. It also requested funding through USAID’s Central America Regional program to strengthen trilateral cooperation on citizen security with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.³³ Nevertheless, to date, very little U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean has been provided through trilateral initiatives.

Analysts have identified several potential benefits of engaging in trilateral cooperation. At a time when U.S. aid budgets are constrained, the U.S. government may be able to increase the impact of limited resources by implementing jointly funded projects with emerging donors. Trilateral cooperation also may be more cost-effective than traditional bilateral aid as a result of lower personnel and service costs in emerging donor nations. Moreover, as a result of geographic, historical, and cultural ties, emerging donors may have a better understanding of aid recipients’ challenges and of local solutions that could be replicated, and emerging donors may be able to facilitate U.S. engagement in countries that otherwise would be unreceptive to a U.S. presence.³⁴

Analysts also have raised some concerns about trilateral cooperation. Some critics assert that providing assistance through foreign governments raises serious oversight concerns, as doing so potentially could lead to U.S. funds being used to support activities that otherwise would be prohibited. For example, some are concerned that U.S. agencies could provide funding to Colombia to train foreign security forces that are not eligible for U.S. assistance.³⁵ Although U.S. officials maintain that activities carried out under the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional

³¹ P. Adriana Hayes, “In Development, Three Heads are Better than One,” *USAID Frontlines*, March/April 2012; USAID, “Brazil: Trilateral Cooperation,” August 13, 2015.

³² Colombian Ministry of Defense data provided by the Embassy of Colombia, 2016.

³³ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 3, Fiscal Year 2016*, February 27, 2015, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/238222.pdf>.

³⁴ Christina Xalma and Silvia López, *2015 Report on South-South Cooperation in Ibero-America*, Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), July 2015; Connie Veillette, “USAID Needs to Develop Guidelines for Trilateral Cooperation,” Center for Global Development, February 8, 2012; Talita Yamashiro Fordelone, *Triangular Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness: Can Triangular Co-operation Make Aid More Effective?*, OECD, September 2009.

³⁵ Security Assistance Monitor, “Human Rights Laws in the Way? Use Colombian Trainers,” May 5, 2014.

Security are governed by the same laws and regulations as bilateral U.S. assistance,³⁶ critics argue that more transparency is needed.³⁷ Other concerns about using trilateral cooperation in place of bilateral aid include the potential loss of U.S. branding and the potential for implementation delays due to difficulties harmonizing procedures, standards, and objectives with emerging donors.

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³⁶ U.S. Southern Command, *Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States Southern Command, Before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee*, March 12, 2015.

³⁷ Arlene B. Tickner, *Colombia, the United States, and Security Cooperation by Proxy*, WOLA, March 2014.